C.I. Lewis’ Analytic Epistemology in The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge (1926)

In this work by logician and philosopher C. I. Lewis, the process of analytic learning is introduced through a pragmatic and rational idea of knowing. This took place at the 1926 Howison Lecture at the University of California and opens us up to an idea of learning – away from abstraction and into logic. At the outset, Lewis introduces 3 key elements of pragmatic knowledge:

1. The Given
2. The Concept
3. The Act of Interpretation

Think of these three elements as rooms of knowledge with windows in between. The first room is where you are – situated in ‘The Given’ with all of your sensory knowledge and the notions of the world around you. The Concept is the farthest room and acts as the ‘end point’ you are trying to grasp more knowledge on. The Act of Interpretation is the room in between The Given and The Concept that interprets the information you have to see the end.

To observe Lewis’ knowledge theory, say the middle room is filled with smoke blurring your vision of the learning concept. You can only faintly see what is in the third room, but you are not sure. How would you clear the smoke? You add certain tools to the second room like a fan to circulate, opening a window to allow in oxygen, or even an air purifier to clear the room only to find once the smoke clears you can see the concept. The concept may have been somewhat similar to what you previously saw, but a new form of knowledge has taken place of the old. These tools can be called hypothesis or interdisciplinary models to make the concept clearer from your interpretation of given knowledge. As the second room is clear of smoke, so does the concept become clearer of what you are to learn.

These elements – for Lewis – are at the root of logic and knowledge as the three and are inseparable. He writes:

“In the matrix of thought these are inseparable; they can only be distinguished by analysis [hypothesis and interdisciplinary models].” (p. 205)

Only through the process of analysis can a concept be clear and present within given knowledge; thus, knowledge can only be observed when the act of interpretation toward it is being engaged. As in, the universe is observed, because individuals have an urge to observe the universe. Illness and medication is observed, because individuals have an urge to observe illness and medication – and so on. This leads to his theory that observing a topic is only undertaken through need or interest for guided truth or situational practicality (a time and place where an observed fact happens):

“These are, then, the bare fundamentals of the pragmatist position concerning knowledge: that knowledge is interpretation, instigated by need or interest and tested by its consequences of action, which individual minds put upon something confronting them or giving them.” (p. 206)

As he discusses mathematics and other disciplines there is a clear separation between the idealist: the generic wandering mind, imperfect to proclivities and always searching; and the pragmatist: distinct and reactionary to the knowledge and situations that confront the pragmatist. They are at odds based on fundamental views of knowledge; however, the wandering mind toward truth in the face of reactionary situations is at the heart of analytic epistemology. The wandering brain searching for new science is needed, but as Lewis suggests, it’s within limits of a practical and fundamental reaction to the situation that calls the pragmatists attention.

This comes down to the analytical determination that obscurity can be applied in any situation, but if something is to not be obscured through pure logic – its pragmatic end is truth. Two men are arguing about a boat in the harbor, one says the bow is aqua colour, the other says turquoise. The colour is obscurity but should not get in the way of pure logic. For example, a third party intervenes with the arguing men and asks: “what the objective of this colour battle is?” They say: “they are trying to observe the object and make a distinction”. Well, if the object is the logic behind the situation, the fundamental reaction is to obscure the colour and determine what the object is. Now there may be obscuring of the boat (schooner, sail, dinghy etc.), but all three men agree that the aqua or turquoise object is a boat of some sort. In many ways, it does not matter of the colour in this situation – as that is idealist wandering. Rather, the bare fundamentals rest on the pragmatic and analytic connecting the given to the concept.

This epistemology of analytics is to cut through obscurity toward objectivity in topics. Perhaps why most discussions on the analytic epistemology relate to the interdisciplinary world of philosophical-mathematics, or mathematics toward bimodal logic. It is the basis of inductive reasoning starting at A moving through B and ending at C. As opposed to starting at C and working your way back to A. One might ask if C is the solution, why not build backwards to A? Because alphabetical logic would deduce that the starting point is A in any problem, given the solution is only perceived to be C. Deductive reasoning concludes C is the only answer, connected to B from A. Whereas A through B, ending at C could produce other variables leading to D, E, or F. Not to mention, the B variable can change based on based on the act of interpretation – something that cannot be done with the introductory perception of C being the solution. In addition, analytic epistemology of deduction would be not instigated by need or interest considering induction already solved the problem – thus moot.

“Before we set out upon any systematic investigation, we must have initial concepts in our minds…The real reasons why we do use [initial] concepts is, of course, practical…But however we come by such initial meanings, it is obvious that we must have them before we address ourselves to any problem.” (p. 211)

Lewis concludes that knowledge cannot be found in The Given, only through the interpretation of knowledge toward clear concepts. This is the inductive and fundamental base of learning. It is impossible to be deductive and start at the concept, given innateness is not a concept, and concepts are not given. For analytic epistemology, it works the same: only our given ideals can be formed through the analytic process of acting on interpretation finding a concept. Thus, statements are only mere rhetoric without the act of interpretation from a given knowledge or base. This is at the heart of science and finding truth. Moving forward, I may do some other post and perhaps some podcasts using analytical epistemology as the process in either my writings or discussion.

References

Lewis, C. I. (1926). The pragmatic element in knowledge. In the 1926 Howison Lecture at The University of California Publications in Philosophy: Berkeley, CA.

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